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The Assignment of Choses in Action
By L. L. Briggs
Assignments of accounts receivable have increased in volume 
and number to such an extent that accountants have become 
interested in the legal aspects of such transfers. The court 
decisions dealing specifically with such assignments are few, 
but the subject is fully covered by the common law on assign­
ments of “choses in action,” a rather broad legal term which 
includes accounts receivable. Consequently, the statements in 
this paper that concern choses in action apply to accounts 
receivable.
By the rules of the early common law, choses in action were not 
assignable because it was thought to be impossible to transfer 
property which was not in possession. It was soon found that a 
rigid adherence to this principle was inconvenient in practice and 
detrimental to the interests of business, so various methods of 
getting around it were devised. The first method of evading the 
rule was by an appeal to the courts of equity, which were liberal 
in the recognition of new forms of property and had decided at an 
early date that choses in action were assignable. Stimulated by 
this liberality, the common-law courts began to search for some 
way by which they could follow the doctrine of “stare 
decisis” and permit chose-in-action assignments. Gradually 
they developed the device of giving power of attorney to 
the assignee to collect the claim from the debtor and to 
keep the proceeds under the theory that the assignee acted as 
the agent of the assignor. The next step has been taken in 
some states by the enactment of statutes which permit the 
assignee to sue in his own name if this is necessary in order 
to collect the debt and make all assignments formerly recognized 
only in equity equally valid in law (Hooker v. Eagle Bank (1864) 
30 N. Y. 83).
In most jurisdictions the courts agree that accounts receivable 
based upon goods sold and delivered are assignable in equity 
(Dix v. Cobb (1808) 4 Mass. 508). Both liquidated and un­
liquidated book accounts are included (Crocker v. Whitney (1813) 
10 Mass. 316). According to Justice Hoke in Atlantic and North
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Carolina Railroad Company v. Atlantic and Northern Company 
(1908) 147 N. C. 368:
. . . now it may be stated as a general rule that ... all 
ordinary business contracts are assignable. . . . The follow­
ing criterion is universally adopted: All things in action 
which survive and pass to the personal representatives of a 
decedent creditor as assets . . . are in general assign­
able. . . .
However, there are some circumstances in which accounts re­
ceivable are not assignable. In conformity with the general prin­
ciple that the intent of the parties controls in a contract, if the 
terms of the original contract provide that it shall not be assigned, 
such terms will govern. Justice Hand, in Mueller v. Northwestern 
University (1902) 195 Ill. 236, said:
The rule is laid down . . . that the parties to a contract 
may in terms prohibit its assignment, so that an assignee 
can not succeed to any rights in the contract by virtue of the 
assignment to him and the rule thus announced is well sup­
ported by authorities.
Where there are mutual accounts, a particular item of credit in 
one of them may not be assigned before a balance is struck 
(Nonantum Worsted Company v. Webb, 124 Pa. St. 125). The 
court, in Whittle v. Skinner (1851) 23 Vt. 531, decided that an un­
liquidated partnership balance was not assignable.
The equity courts of some states permit the assignment of fu­
ture accounts receivable, and when the accounts come into exist­
ence the situation is the same as in the case of an assignment of 
existing accounts. The effect of such an assignment is to give 
the assignee power of attorney to collect the accounts when they 
come into being. Since one may give power of attorney to collect 
a debt which is to come into existence tomorrow as readily as to 
collect one already in existence, there is no reason why the courts 
of equity should treat an assignment of future accounts as differ­
ing from an assignment of present accounts.
That the assignment of a debt not due is valid if there is an 
existing contract out of which the debt may arise was held by the 
court in Monarch Discount Company v. Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway Company (1918) 285 Ill. 233. It was decided in Tailby 
v. The Official Recorder, 13 A. C. 523, that unearned book accounts 
are assignable although they are to be earned thereafter by the 
assignor in another business. It is generally necessary to specify
331
The Journal of Accountancy
the transactions whereby the future accounts are to arise (Sperry 
v. Clarke, 76 Iowa 503). In Davis v. Pitcher, 97 Iowa 13, it was 
held to be sufficient to describe the accounts to accrue from the 
sale of certain merchandise. But, if the accounts are to arise from 
contracts not yet made, the assignment of such accounts is gener­
ally held invalid as against creditors of the assignor (Raulins v. 
Levi (1919) 232 Mass. 42). Where there is no existing contract 
from which the claim is expected to arise, the right to assign a 
future account has been denied by the courts of Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. In Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 
the court decided that accounts to be earned in the future by the 
practice of medicine were not assignable although there was an 
earlier decision in the same state to the contrary effect.
In the absence of a statute prescribing the form of assignment 
or a contract provision between the parties as to the manner of 
assignment, no particular form of words is necessary to effect a 
valid assignment of a chose in action. According to Justice Beck 
in Moore v. Lowrey, 25 Iowa 336:
No particular form is necessary to constitute an assignment 
of a debt. If the intent of the parties to effect an assignment 
be clearly established, that is sufficient.
Anything which shows an intention to assign on the one side, and 
from which an assent to receive may be inferred on the other, will 
operate as an assignment, if sustained by a sufficient consideration.
The original parties to the contract may make any agreement 
they may desire as to the mode of making assignments and 
such agreements will govern. If there is more than one assignee 
the one to whom the chose in action is assigned according to the 
terms of the contract will prevail over one to whom the claim was 
not so assigned (Fortunato v. Patten (1895) 147 N. Y. 277).
Choses in action may be assigned by parol in most jurisdic­
tions. According to Chief Justice Mansfield in Heath v. Hall 
(1812) 4 Taunton 326:
If two men agree for the sale of a debt and one of them gives 
the other credit in his books for the price, that may be a very 
good assignment in equity; its resting in parol is no objection.
In Union Trust Company v. Bulkeley (1907) 150 Fed. 510, the 
court maintained that an assignment of a chose in action by parol 
as security was valid. Oral assignments of book accounts have 
been upheld by the courts of Mississippi and Vermont.
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It has been ruled in Williams v. Ingersoll, 87 N. Y. 508, and by 
the courts of nearly every jurisdiction that assignments need not 
be in writing. However, the statutes of a few states make only 
assignments in writing valid at law (Planters' Bank v. Prater, 64 
Ga. 609). In Iowa it was decided in an early case that assign­
ments of book accounts must be in writing in order to authorize 
the assignee to sue on the instrument in his own name (Andrews 
v. Brown, 1 Iowa 154) but Wisconsin has a contrary rule (Woolis- 
croft v. Norton (1862) 15 Wis. 198). Where the statutes authorize 
assignments of choses in action, when applied to written instru­
ments, it has been held to mean written assignments, according to 
the court in Miller v. Paulsell, 8 Mo. 355. Written assignments 
may be under seal (Everit v. Strong (1844) 7 Hill 585).
Assignments of accounts receivable may be inferred from the 
conduct of the parties {Coates v. Emporia First National Bank 
(1882) 91 N. Y. 20). That mere delivery of written evidence of 
the debt may be sufficient was ruled in Jones v. Witter (1816) 13 
Mass. 304, and the giving of power of attorney to collect a debt 
may be considered an equitable assignment thereof, if the parties 
so intend {People v. Tioga Common Pleas (1838) 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
73). In Ryan v. Maddux, 6 Cal. 247, the court maintained that 
an account could be assigned by the owner writing the word “as­
signed” above his signature.
There must be some sort of a delivery in order that an assign­
ment of a chose in action take effect {White v. Kilgore, 77 Me. 
571) but it need not be an actual delivery in order to pass the bene­
ficial interest to the assignee. It may be constructive, according 
to the court in Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Company 
(1823) 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 268. Any act of the assignor indicating 
that he relinquishes to the assignee the control over the chose in 
action will amount to constructive delivery thereof {Richardson v. 
White (1896) 167 Mass. 58). If the assignment is written, the 
delivery of the writing is all that is necessary {Tatum v. Ballard, 
94 Va. 370). The delivery of a copy of a book account was held 
a sufficient delivery in Akin v. Meeker (1894) 78 Hun (N. Y.) 387 
but the court in Cornwell v. Baldwin's Creek 43 N. Y. Supp. 771, 
gave a contrary decision. That constructive delivery of the chose 
in action is valid even as against creditors was held in Fisher v. 
Bradford, 7 Me. 28.
There is much confusion in the early English cases as to the 
necessity for consideration in chose assignments. It seems quite 
333
The Journal of Accountancy
probable that originally consideration was not essential, but that 
later there was a change of view on the part of the courts. At the 
present time an English court of equity will not assist an assignee 
of a chose in action unless the assignment was made upon valid 
consideration (Edwards v. Jones, 1 Myl. & Cr. 226). In the United 
States the rule is that the assignee is permitted to sue in his own 
name in the case of an absolute assignment of accounts receivable 
even though there was no consideration (Stone v. Frost, 61 N. Y. 
614). The same principle was upheld by the court in Young v. 
Hudson, 99 Mo. 102. If an assignment of a chose in action is 
made as collateral it has been held that there must be adequate 
consideration to render the assignment valid against creditors 
of the assignor {Langley v. Berry, 14 N. H. 82). The assignment 
of a chose in action imposes on the debtor an equitable and moral 
obligation to pay the assignee, which is a good consideration for an 
express promise on the part of the debtor to pay the assignee and 
will authorize a suit in the name of the latter. This was the de­
cision of the court in Burrows v. Glover (1871)106 Mass. 324, and 
in several other cases. If the assignment has been made without 
consideration, the payment by the debtor to the assignor has been 
held a good defense to a suit by the assignee {Dunning v. Say- 
ward, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 366).
Except with regard to a few special classes of choses in action, 
such as future earnings which several states require to be recorded 
for the protection of the assignee, assignments of choses in action 
are not included by the recording statutes, and such assignments 
are valid without filing and recording in any office of public record 
(Aultman v. McConnell (1888) 34 Fed. 274). Statutes in many 
states make a mortgage effective against creditors if it is recorded, 
but such acts have generally been held not to apply to choses 
in action {Young v. Upson (1902) 115 Mass. 192). According to 
the supreme court of the United States in Benedict v. Ratner 
(1925) 268 U. S. 353:
The statutes which embody the doctrine and provide for re­
cording as a substitute for delivery do not include accounts.
The assignment of a chose in action conveys, as between as­
signor and assignee, the right which the assignor then possesses 
to that thing and the law will assist the assignee to assert that just 
and proper claim. All remedies open to the assignor for the en­
forcement of the obligation are open to the assignee (Crippen v.
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Jacobson, 56 Mich. 386). Justice Treat stated the attitude of the 
courts in Chapman v. Shattuck (1846) 8 Ill. 49, where he said:
The doctrine is now well settled that courts of law will recog­
nize and protect the rights of the assignees of a chose in action, 
whether the assignment be good at law or in equity only.
Centuries ago the rule became established in England that when 
the owner of a claim made an assignment of it, he thereby gave 
the assignee the power to enforce it in his stead, and this power 
was irrevocable. At common law the assignee did not have a 
legal right which he could enforce in his own name, but merely 
an equitable interest to secure which he was given the right to 
use the name of the assignor (Usher v. D’Wolfe (1816) 13 Mass. 
290). According to Justice Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142 
Mass. 366:
According to the modern decisions, courts of law recognize the 
assignment of a chose in action, so far as to vest an equitable 
interest in the assignee, and authorize him to bring an action 
in the name of the assignor, and recover a judgment for his 
own benefit.
This is the rule in most of our states. Louisiana is an exception. 
In that state no distinction is made between the legal and the 
equitable title, and the assignee of an open account may sue in 
his own name (Kilgour v. Ratcliff, 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 252).
In order to entitle the assignee to bring the action in his name, 
the federal courts and those of Georgia, Iowa, Maryland and Mis­
sissippi require that the assignment be in writing. Where the 
legal title is transferred to the assignee, the assignor can not sue, 
so the assignee is the only party who can collect from the debtor 
(Beck v. Rosser, 68 Miss. 72). That the assignee of an obligation 
to pay money must sue in his own name was decided by the court 
in Carhart v. Miller, 5 N. J. L. 675.
In some jurisdictions the statutes provide that actions must be 
brought by the real parties in interest, with the result that often 
the assignee can not sue at law in the name of the assignor but must 
proceed in his own name on the chose. If the assignee holds the 
chose for the benefit of another or under an agreement is bound 
to account to another for the proceeds, he is regarded, in several 
states, as the trustee of an express trust, and he may sue in his 
own name without joining his beneficiary (Murphin v. Scovell, 44 
Minn. 530). Where claims were assigned to an attorney for col­
lection and application of the proceeds to the payment of debts 
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of the assignor in the attorney’s hands, the court, in Wynne v. 
Heck, 92 N. C. 414, decided that the assignee was the real party 
in interest and could sue alone. However, according to the de­
cision given in Pleasants v. Erskine, 82 Ala. 386, if the assignee is 
to account for the proceeds of an assigned chose in action he is 
not the real party in interest and can not sue in his own name.
If the debtor makes an express promise to the assignee to pay 
him the debt, the assignee then has the right to sue in his own 
name. The reason underlying this rule was stated by Justice 
Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366:
The law that, if the debtor assents to the assignment in such 
a manner as to imply a promise to the assignee to pay him the 
sum assigned, then the assignee can maintain an action, rests 
upon the theory that the assignment has transferred the prop­
erty in the sum assigned to the assignee as the consideration of 
the debtor’s promise to pay the assignee, and that by this prom­
ise the indebtedness to the assignor is pro tanto discharged.
An assignment made as collateral security for a debt transfers 
only a qualified interest in the assigned chose and this is true al­
though the assignment on its face is absolute (Jarboe v. Templer, 
38 Fed. 213). To the extent of his interest, the assignee is the 
owner of the collateral as against the assignor and he may sue 
thereon {Sullivan v. Sweeney (1872) 111 Mass. 366). If he ob­
tains the legal title he may recover the full amount of the chose 
in action from the debtor notwithstanding the fact that he holds 
the chose as security for a debt (Ginochio v. Amador Canal, 67 
Cal. 493). However, in Cerf v. Ashley, 68 Cal. 419, the court 
maintained that where a chose in action is assigned as collateral 
security, the assignor must join the assignee in an action against 
the debtor because the assignor is one of the parties in interest. 
The English courts do not permit the assignee of a chose in action 
to sue in his own name where the assignment is for the purpose of 
security (Durham v. Robertson (1898) 1 Q. B. 765). After the 
debt for which the collateral was given is paid, the right to hold 
the collateral ceases, and the assignee has no interest in it that he 
can transfer to another. If there is a balance after the debt has 
been paid from the assigned security, the assignee is liable to the 
assignor for that amount.
If the assignor becomes insolvent after the assignment and 
bankruptcy proceedings are begun, the assignee may still use the 
assignor’s name in suing the debtor and the bankruptcy will be no 
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defense (Matherson v. Wilkinson (1851) 79 Me. 159). In Lyford 
v. Dunn (1856) 32 N. H. 81, the court held that the assignee is a 
creditor within the meaning of the insolvency act requiring notice 
to creditors.
Among the rights possessed by the assignee of a chose in action 
is that of transferring the chose to a second assignee {Dawes v. 
Boylston (1812) 9 Mass. 337). The latter would take it subject to 
all equities between the original parties. Or an assignee may re­
assign the chose to the original assignor and the latter may main­
tain an action against the debtor in his own name in spite of a 
promise of the debtor to pay the first assignee if the debtor has 
not been notified of the reassignment (Clark v. Parker (1849) 4 
Cush. 361). The assignment of a chose gives to the assignee the 
right to control the court proceedings and to dismiss the suit 
(Southwick v. Hopkins (1860) 47 Me. 362). A court of equity will 
restrain the assignor from interfering with an action brought by 
the assignee in the assignor’s name {Deaver v. Eller, 42 N. C. 24) 
and the assignee can hold the assignor who collects the debt in a 
common-law action for money had and received {Camp v. Tomp­
kins (1833) 9 Conn. 545). In some circumstances the assignee 
may acquire a higher right against the debtor than the assignor 
had before the assignment. For example, the debtor may act in 
such a manner that his conduct will estop him from asserting 
against the assignee his equities against the assignor. If the 
debtor promises the assignee before the assignment has been made 
that he will pay the full amount of the claim, equities between the 
assignor and the debtor with respect to the assigned chose in 
action will not affect the assignee. This principle is laid down in 
numerous decisions.
The assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all equities 
existing between the debtor and the assignor at the time of the 
assignment (Schenuit Rubber Company v. International Finance 
Corporation (Md. 1925) 130 Atl. 331). The assignment vests in 
the assignee the same title possessed by the assignor and no more. 
According to Lord Chancellor St. Leonards in Mangles v. Dixon 
(1852) 18 Eng. L. & Eq., 82:
... if a man does take an assignment of a chose in action, he 
must take his chance as to the exact position in which the 
party giving it stands. . . . Whatever may be the state of 
the account . . . the man who takes an assignment . . . 
must take it just as he finds it . . .
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According to Justice Story, in Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason (U. S.) 
201, this principle applies only to the specific chose in action which 
is assigned and not to other equities subsisting between the parties 
as to other debts or transactions.
Although the assignee takes the chose subject to the valid liens 
of the debtor against it at the time of the assignment (First Ward 
National Bank v. Thomas, 125 Mass. 278) he does not take it sub­
ject to equities of third persons of which he had no notice 
(Himrod v. Bolton, 44 Ill. App. 516). The principle and the 
reason for it have been well expressed by Chancellor Kent, in 
Murray v. Lylburn (1817) 2 Johns. Ch. 441, where this great 
jurist said:
It is a general and well-settled principle, that the assignee of a 
chose in action takes it subject to the same equity it was sub­
ject to in the hands of the assignor. But this rule is generally 
understood to mean the equity residing in the original obligor 
or debtor, and not an equity residing in some third person 
against the assignor. The assignee can always go to the 
debtor, and ascertain what claims he may have against the 
. . . chose in action, which he is about purchasing from the 
obligee; but he may not be able, with the utmost diligence, 
to ascertain the latent equity of some third person against 
the obligee.
Vermont, apparently, does not follow the general rule, for in 
Downer v. South Royalton Bank (1867) 39 Vt. 25, the court 
decided that the assignee took the chose in action subject to 
claims in favor of a third person although no notice had been 
given.
If the assignee suspects equities between the assignor and the 
debtor and mistrusts deception on the part of the former, it is his 
duty to inquire of the debtor as to his claims against the assignor 
when notice is given of the assignment. If he fails to make in­
quiry and pays more for the assignment than its value, due to the 
hidden equities of the debtor against the assignor, he must stand 
the loss. If proper inquiry is made the debtor is bound to inform 
the assignee of the real circumstances and if he fails to give the 
information he will not be permitted to take advantage of the 
equities existing between him and the assignor. The debtor has 
the same obligation of disclosure if the notice on its face shows the 
deception of the assignee. But if there is no notice of fraud and 
nothing to lead the debtor to think that the assignee is likely to 
sustain a loss, it is usually considered that the former is under no 
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obligation to volunteer information. In Mangles v. Dixon (1852) 
18 Eng. L. & Eq. 82, Lord Chancellor St. Leonards said:
I conceive that equity will not require the party who receives 
the notice, impertinently almost, to interfere between two 
parties who have dealt behind his back, and who have never 
made any communication to him or even seen him, on that 
subject.
The debtor may subject the chose in action in the hands of the 
assignee to all equities against the assignor and all defenses he had 
against the assignor prior to the time he receives notice of the 
assignment {Littlefield v. Albany County Bank, 97 N. Y. 581). 
This is true although the assignee is ignorant of such defenses 
{Wood v. Perry (1847) 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 114) and he has not had 
notice of the equities. In order to protect his interests the as­
signee should notify the debtor of the assignment as soon as possi­
ble. After the notification neither the assignor nor the debtor can 
divest the assignee of his rights in the chose in action {Brice v. 
Bannister, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 569). The debtor can set up no 
defense which accrued to him after notice of the assignment 
{Upton v. Moore (1872) 44 Vt. 552). But he may take advantage 
of any equities between him and the assignor prior to notice of the 
assignment for the reason that equities after the assignment but 
before the notice are usually founded upon a continued course of 
dealing between the debtor and the assignor, and the debtor has 
reason to believe that the course of dealing has not been affected 
by the assignment until he has notice of that transfer. But after 
receiving the notice, neither payment by him to the assignor nor a 
release by the latter will affect the rights of the assignee against 
the debtor {Jones v. Witter (1816) 13 Mass. 304). The decision 
given in the case of Thorn v. Myers, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 210, is an 
outstanding exception to the general rule. The court ruled that 
where the assignment passed the legal title in the chose to the 
assignee the debtor could not set up equities acquired against the 
assignor after assignment but prior to notice thereof.
The debtor has the right of set-off in respect to any equities be­
tween him and the assignor and also between him and the assignee 
prior to notice of the assignment {Hackett v. Martin (1831) 8 
Green 77). But he may not set-off a claim held by him at the 
time of the assignment if he had notice from the assignee that the 
assignment was about to be made and did not disclose such claim 
{King v. Fowler (1820) 16 Mass. 397). Neither may the debtor
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set-off any claim accruing or procured subsequent to the notice 
{Bartlett v. Pearson, 29 Me. 9). Furthermore, the chose in the 
hands of the assignee is not subject to set-off by the debtor if the 
obligation is not mature at the date of the notice {Breen v. Seward, 
11 Gray (Mass.) 118). A promise on the part of the debtor to the 
assignee to pay him the full amount of the assigned chose in action 
has been held to be a waiver of all right of set-off against the 
assignor, existing at the time or arising at a later date {King v. Fowler 
(1820) 16 Mass. 397).
For the purpose of protecting his claim to the assigned chose in 
action, the assignee should give immediate notice of the assign­
ment to the debtor. According to Justice Dodge, in Skobis v. 
Ferge, 102 Wis. 122:
. . . The authorities are overwhelming, and almost without 
dissent, that no assignment of a chose in action can have any 
effect upon the debtor or fundholder, or interfere with his 
dealings with the fund until brought to his notice.
As between the assignee and the debtor the assignment does not 
become operative until the time of notice to the latter and until 
such notice is received. The debtor still remains a debtor to the 
assignor and may pay him the obligation. Justice Willes, in L. 
R. 5 C. P. 594, maintained that it is:
A rule of general jurisprudence that if a person enters into a 
contract, and, without notice of any assignment, fulfills it to 
the person with whom he made the contract, he is discharged 
from the obligation.
But, as between the assignor and the assignee, it is not necessary 
to the validity of the assignment that the debtor be notified {Allyn 
v. Allyn (1891) 154 Mass. 570).
Until the debtor receives notice of the assignment he may deal 
with the assignor as if the assignment had not been made and he 
will be protected as to all bona-fide defenses arising before he 
had knowledge of the assignment {Campbell v. Day (1844) Vt. 
558) and the same evidence that would be admissible between the 
original parties is admissible against the assignee {Loomis v. 
Loomis (1854) 26 Vt. 198). He may safely pay the assignor 
(Ashcomb's Case (1674) 1 Ch. Cas. 232) or the assignor may re­
lease him from the obligation. Creditors of the assignor may 
attach the fund at any time before the debtor has notice {Wood­
bridge v. Perkins (1809) 3 Day (Conn.) 364). If a judgment is 
entered against the debtor garnishee prior to notice, the creditor 
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will be entitled to preference over the assignee (Wood v. Partridge 
(1814) 11 Mass. 488). It is worthy of notice that the court, in 
McDonald v. Kneeland, 5 Minn. 352, made a contrary decision in 
regard to this point. It has been said that notice to the debtor 
plays a part in the assignment of a chose in action similar to that 
which recording the deed does in a grant of land.
After the debtor has knowledge of the assignment the chose 
becomes fixed in his hands and he is inhibited from doing anything 
which may prejudice the rights of the assignee. Payment by him 
to the nominal creditor will be no defense to an action brought for 
the benefit of the assignee (Littlefield v. Storey (1808) 3 Johns. 
(N. Y.) 425). Any compromise or adjustment of the cause of 
action by the original parties, made after notice of the assignment 
but without consent of the assignee, will be void against him 
(Dunn v. Snell (1819) 15 Mass. 481). An accord and satisfaction 
entered into and carried out between the assignor and the debtor 
who has had notice will be invalid as against the assignee (Jenkins 
v. Brewster (1817) 14 Mass. 291). Neither attachment nor 
garnishment by creditors of the assignor can defeat the rights of 
the assignee after the debtor has learned of the transfer of the 
chose in action. If the assignee has only a qualified interest in the 
chose, the debtor may deal with the assignor after notice, but he 
deals subject to the interest of the assignee and is liable to the 
assignee only to the extent of that interest (Sanders v. Soutter, 
136 N. Y. 97).
The notice to the debtor need not be in any particular form. 
An assignment will bind him if he has such knowledge of facts and 
circumstances as ought to put him on inquiry. No special notice 
is necessary nor need the assignee exhibit to the debtor the instru­
ment itself or any other evidence. However, in Skobis v. Ferge, 
102 Wis. 122, Justice Dodge says:
The notice to him (the debtor), therefore, must be of so exact 
and specific a character as to convince him that he is no 
longer liable to such original creditor, and to place in his 
hands the means of defense against him, or at least the in­
formation necessary to interplead the assignee.
Acceptance of the notice by the debtor is not essential to its 
validity (Kingman v. Perkins (1870) 105 Mass. 1ll) because the 
assent of the debtor is unnecessary to complete the assignment.
The determination of the rights of assignees where the assignor 
makes a second assignment of the same chose in action has caused 
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the courts considerable trouble. In the leading English case on the 
subject, Dearl v. Hall (1823, Ch.) 3 Russ 1, the court established 
the rule that a subsequent assignee of a cestui’s interest who in­
quired of the trustee and gave notice of his assignment would be 
given precedence over a prior assignee who did not give such notice. 
This principle was approved by the house of lords in Foster v. 
Cockerell (1835, H. L.) 3 C1. & F. 456. The rule was later broad­
ened to such an extent that it now includes all choses in action. 
The court, in Meaux v. Bell (1841, Ch.) 1 Hare 73, said:
The omission of the puisne encumbrancer to make inquiry 
can not be material where inquiry of the circumstances of 
the case would not have led to a knowledge of the prior en­
cumbrance.
This statement has been interpreted to mean that inquiry of the 
debtor by the subsequent assignee was not required, with the 
result that since 1841 the subsequent assignee could fix his rights 
without inquiry if he gave the necessary notice. An excellent 
present-day statement of the English rule is given by Justice 
Lawlor in Adamson v. Paonessa (1919) 180 Cal. 157 where he 
quotes the court in Widenmann v. Weiniger, 164 Cal. 667 as 
follows:
As between successive assignees of a chose in action, he will 
have a preference who first gives notice to the debtor, even 
if he be a subsequent assignee, providing at the time of taking 
it he had no notice of the prior assignment.
The basis for the English rule seems to be that the negligence of 
the prior assignee in failing to notify the debtor of his assignment 
should estop him from asserting any claim that would jeopardize 
the interest of the subsequent assignee who has paid full value for 
the chose in action and who has no way of learning of the prior as­
signment. This is an application of the principle of estoppel and 
of the old rule of equity, that of two innocent parties, one of whom 
must suffer, he whose act or omission caused the loss must bear it. 
Later courts adopting this rule have justified their action on the 
ground that it was the only way to protect against the fraud of 
the assignor (Jenkinson v. New York Finance Company (1911) 79 
N. J. Eq. 247).
There are some circumstances in which the English rule does not 
apply. The second assignee may not recover unless he has given 
consideration to the assignor for the assignment. A gratuitous 
assignment of a chose in action or one given in consideration of an 
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antecedent debt is not sufficient, according to the court in Davis v. 
State National Bank (1913) 156 S. W. 321, although there has been 
at least one decision to the contrary in which a creditor assignee 
was considered to be in the same secure position as an assignee for 
value (In re Furnace Company (1916) 233 Fed. 451). The court, 
in Laclede Bank v. Schuler (1887) 120 U. S. 511, decided that an 
assignee in bankruptcy would be given the same protection by law 
as an assignee for value. In Third National Bank v. Atlantic City 
(1903) 126 Fed. 413, the prior assignee was permitted to prevail 
over the attaching creditor of a subsequent assignee who had 
given first notice of the assignment. Notice of the prior assign­
ment will defeat the rights of the subsequent assignee (Powell v. 
Powell (1909) 217 Mo. 571). There is some conflict of authority 
as to who has the burden of proof in respect to the notice. In 
Wagenhurst v. Wineland (1902) 20 App. D. C. 85, the court ruled 
that the subsequent assignee should be responsible but it was 
decided in Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, that the prior 
assignee must prove the notice in order to defeat the later assignee.
The American rule is that between equal equities the prior 
assignee takes good title to the chose in action. The subsequent 
assignee gets nothing, because the assignor transferred all his right 
to the chose to the first assignee and consequently he had nothing 
which he could assign to the second assignee. Notice to the 
debtor by the subsequent assignee can not affect the title of the 
prior assignee because the latter already has the right to the chose 
in action. Although no notice to the debtor is necessary as be­
tween assignee and assignor (Quigley v. Welter (1905) 95 Minn. 383) 
if notice of the assignment is not given the debtor may discharge 
his liability by paying the subsequent assignee or the assignor 
(Commonwealth v. Sides (1896) 176 Pa. 616). If the debtor pays 
the debt to the subsequent assignee or to the assignor without 
notice of the assignment it is only just that he be protected against 
the prior assignee since it is through the silence of the latter that 
the debtor has made the payment to the wrong party. Should 
the last assignee receive payment when estoppel is not present he 
holds the funds as trustee for the first assignee (Rabinowitz v. 
Peoples National Bank (1920) 235 Mass. 102).
If the second assignee is clever or swift enough to obtain pay­
ment from the debtor he will be able to defeat the claims of the 
prior assignee (Rabinowitz v. Peoples National Bank (1920) 235 
Mass. 102). When the last assignee makes a novation with the 
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debtor his claim to the chose in action is better than that of the 
earlier assignee according to the court in New York, New Haven & 
H. R. R. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y. 30. If the last assignee sues 
the debtor and reduces his claim to a judgment he will be per­
mitted by the courts to prevail over the prior assignee (Judson v. 
Corcoran (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 612). In this case, a second as­
signee of a claim against the Mexican government, who gave imme­
diate notice of his assignment to the secretary of state, prosecuted 
his claim before the commissioners and obtained an award. The 
court held that the subsequent assignee had a better title than the 
prior assignee who gave no notice of his assignment and made no 
effort to enforce his claim until after the award had been made. 
That the first assignee may act in such a manner as to estop him 
from denying that the last assignee has priority was decided in 
Security Company v. Delfs (1920) 47 Cal. App. 599. If he permits 
the assignor to retain possession of the evidence of the chose, thus 
enabling the latter to dispose of it to a bona-fide assignee for value 
or by his laches he stands by and permits a subsequent assignee to 
recover on the chose in action there is excellent authority which 
denies him a claim to the property involved.
Neither the English nor the American rule applies where the 
assignor and the debtor specify the method of assignment. That 
assignee has the best claim with whom the assignor made the 
assignment according to the provisions of the contract with the 
debtor, irrespective of whether he is the prior assignee or the sub­
sequent assignee (Fortunato v. Patten (1895) 147 N. Y. 277). If 
the assignment is made with power of revocation, a subsequent 
assignment of the same chose in action will revoke the first assign­
ment, according to the court in McCormick v. Sadler, 14 Utah 463. 
If the statutes of a jurisdiction require the recordation of this type 
of assignment, the assignee who fails to record will have no priority 
over another assignee, prior or subsequent, who obeys the law and 
places his assignment on the public records (Peabody v. Lewiston 
(1891) 83 Me. 286).
There seems to be an irreconcilable conflict among the American 
decisions in respect to the status of the assignees where there have 
been subsequent assignments. The federal courts and those of 
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
and Canada follow the English rule while the American rule is 
followed by the courts of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken­
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tucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hamp­
shire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West 
Virginia, and Washington. The supreme court of the United 
States in early times seemed to favor the English rule. In Spain 
v. Hamilton's Administrator (1863) 1 Wall (U. S.) 604 the court 
stated the following rather strong dictum:
As the assignee is generally entitled to all the remedies of the 
assignor so he is subject to all the equities between the as­
signor and his debtor. But in order to perfect his title against 
the debtor, it is indispensable that the assignee should im­
mediately give notice of the assignment to the debtor, for 
otherwise a priority of right may be obtained by a subse­
quent assignee, or the debt may be discharged by a payment 
to the assignee before such notice.
Since this dictum was not law the position of our highest court was 
uncertain until 1924 when the English rule was rejected and the 
American rule was adopted in Salem Trust Company v. Manufac­
turers' Finance Company (1924) 44 Sup. Ct. 266. In this case the 
Nelson Company assigned to the petitioner for value a debt 
amounting to $45,000 due it under a contract and later the assignor 
assigned the same debt to the defendant who failed to inquire 
of the debtor regarding previous assignments and had no notice of 
the prior assignment to the petitioner. The defendant notified 
the debtor of the assignment before the petitioner. Later the 
Nelson Company became bankrupt, and the supreme court held 
that as between the petitioner and the defendant, the one whose 
assignment was prior in time should prevail.
Some of the early writers justified the English rule on the ground 
of an analogy to the sale of a chattel to a later vendee by a vendor 
who had been allowed to remain in possession in which case the 
first vendee is not permitted to assert his title against that of the 
second assignee because he allowed the vendor to retain the indicia 
of ownership. This reasoning is not now applicable in the states 
which have adopted the uniform-sales act because section 25 of 
that act provides that a second assignee who relies on the reten­
tion of possession by the vendor and who purchases for value and 
obtains delivery is protected. Consequently, the second vendee 
does not need the protection of the common law. Others main­
tain that the prior assignee knows that he has the opportunity to 
protect himself against subsequent assignments by notifying the 
debtor of the assignment and if he is so negligent that he fails to 
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take this precaution his claim should not take precedence over 
that of a subsequent assignee for value without notice.
The American rule seems more reasonable because the assignor 
transfers all his interest in the chose in action to the first assignee 
and he should not be permitted to accept value from a second 
assignee for the assignment of a right which he no longer possesses. 
To hold otherwise would encourage fraud on the part of the as­
signor. According to the court in Columbia Finance Company 
v. First Natonal Bank (1903) 116 Ky. 364:
The rule of caveat emptor applies to sales of choses in action 
as in other sales of personal property, and if the seller has 
sold the thing to one person, and therefore has no title to pass 
to a second, the latter takes nothing by his purchase.
At common law partial assignments of choses in action may not 
be enforced against the debtor without his consent to the division 
of the debt. In the leading case, Mandeville v. Welch (1820) 5 
Wheat. 277, Justice Story said:
A creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of 
action into many actions, without the consent of his debtor, 
since it may subject him to many embarrassments and re­
sponsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He 
has a right to stand upon the singleness of his original con­
tract, and to decline any legal or equitable assignments, by 
which it may be broken into fragments. When he under­
takes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no part of 
his contract, that he should be obliged to pay in fractions to 
any other person.
Further reasons for the rule are given by Justice Field in James v. 
Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366 where this learned jurist said:
It is not wholly a question of procedure, although the com­
mon law procedure is not adapted to determining the rights 
of different claimants to parts of a fund or debt. The rule 
has been established, partially at least, on the ground of the 
entirety of the contract, because it is held that a creditor 
can not sue his debtor for a part of an entire debt, and, if he 
bring such an action and recover judgment, the judgment is 
a bar to an action to recover the remaining amount. There 
must be distinct promises in order to maintain more than 
one action.
It is only reasonable that the courts should not permit a creditor 
to divide an obligation to pay him a stated sum into parts, and 
assign them to several parties, thereby subjecting his debtor to 
the trouble of having more than one claim presented to him or of 
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defending more than one suit arising out of the original contract. 
The law requires the debtor to comply with his contract but it 
requires no more than this. However, where the debtor consents 
to an assignment of part of his debt, the assignee may sue him on 
this part {Richmond v. Parker, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 48). The right 
to recognize partial assignments of choses in action is personal to 
the debtor and may not be insisted upon by a third party who has 
sued him (Burditt v. Porter (1891) 63 Vt. 296). Where the code 
provides that actions may be brought by the real parties in inter­
est, the assignor of a partial assignment of a chose in action may 
join the assignee in an action to enforce payment by the debtor 
(Singleton v. O'Blemis, 125 Ind. 151).
The main reason for not enforcing a partial assignment of a 
chose in action at common law does not exist in equity because all 
the parties at interest may be brought before the court and their 
rights under the original contract and the assignment or assign­
ments can be settled in one decree so the debtor will not be an­
noyed or inconvenienced by more than one suit on his contract. 
Courts of equity have always recognized partial assignments of 
choses in action for many purposes and will protect the assignee, 
after notice to the debtor, if it is possible to do so without inflict­
ing a hardship upon the latter {Richardson v. White (1896) 167 
Mass. 58). The theory of equity seems to be that the debtor owes 
part to the assignee and part to the assignor. According to Jus­
tice Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366:
It is said that in equity, there may be, without the consent 
of the debtor, an assignment of part of an entire debt. It 
is conceded that, as between assignor and assignee, there may 
be such an assignment. ... In many jurisdictions, courts 
of equity have gone still further, and have held that an assign­
ment of a part of a fund or debt may be enforced in equity by 
a bill brought by the assignee against the debtor and the as- 
signor while the debt remains unpaid. . . . But some courts 
 of equity have gone still further, and have held that after 
notice of a partial assignment of a debt, the debtor can not 
rightfully pay the sum assigned to his creditor, and, if he 
does, that is no defense to a bill by the assignee. The doc­
trine carried to this extent effects a substantial change in the 
law. Under the old rule, the debtor could with safety settle 
with his creditor and pay him, unless he had notice or knowl­
edge of an assignment of the whole of the debt; under this 
rule, he can not, if he have notice or knowledge of an assign­
ment of any part of it.
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The equity courts will not force the debtor to pay the claim 
piecemeal. He may insist upon making a single payment unless 
his contract with his creditor provides otherwise. If he objects 
to paying fractional parts of his indebtedness he may pay the 
whole sum into a court of equity to be distributed by it among the 
parties entitled to the fund. But if he is unable to pay the entire 
indebtedness upon a single decree of the court, he may refuse to 
recognize the partial assignment and nullify the act of the assignor 
(Wilson v. Carson (1857) 12 Md. 54).
By the fact of assignment for a consideration, the assignor 
guarantees that he will not interfere with the chose in action there­
after. Furthermore, he creates an implied covenant that he has 
done and will do nothing to prevent the assignee from collecting it 
(Eaton v. Mellus (1856) 7 Gray (Mass.) 566). Justice Story, in 
Mandeville v. Welch (1820) 5 Wheat. 277, said:
It has long since been settled, that where a chose in action is 
assigned by the owner, he shall not be permitted fraudulently 
to interfere and defeat the rights of the assignee in the pros­
ecution of any suit to enforce those rights. And it has not 
been deemed to make any difference, whether the assignment 
be good at law, or in equity only.
If the assignor does interfere and damage results to the assignee, 
he renders himself liable to the latter (Sanders v. Aldrich, 25 Barb. 
(N. Y.) 63).
In every chose assignment there is an implied warranty on the 
part of the assignor that the chose in action is a genuine and real 
claim in his favor against the debtor (Tyler v. Bailey, 71 Ill. 34). 
Should the claim be invalid, the warranty is broken as soon as it is 
made, and the assignee may immediately sue the assignor and he 
need not return the assigned chose (Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. St. 482). 
If he sues to collect and fails, he is entitled to recover from the 
assignor what he paid for the assignment and his reasonable ex­
penses in such suit (Phoenix Insurance Company v. Parsons (1891) 
129 N. Y. 86) but if he does not bring an action he is entitled to the 
amount he paid for the chose (Barley v. Layman, 79 Va. 518). 
The assignee may seek the return of the consideration paid before 
commencing suit if he so desires (Walsh v. Rogers, 15 Nebr. 309) 
but he must give the assignor notice of any defense set up against 
the assigned chose (Drayton v. Thompson, 1 Bay (S. C.) 263).
It seems to the writer that the courts show by their decisions in 
cases involving chose in action assignments that they appreciate 
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the importance to business of liberal laws in respect to the transfer 
of claims from one party to another. Since transfers of this na­
ture are apparently to occupy a place of more significance in the 
future than they have in the past, such an attitude on the part of 
our jurists will prove helpful to business in general.
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